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Abstract
We consider a (deterministic) evolutionary model where players
have dynamic expectations about the strategy distribution. We pro-
vide a global analysis of the co-evolution of play and expectations for a
generic two–by–two game. Besides the the typical indeterminacy of the
evolutionary dynamics, we find some other ones: for any initial strategy
configuration the dynamics can converge to any asymptotically stable
fixed point, for different initial values of the expectations. Moreover,
starting from the same initial pair of strategy configuration and val-
ues of expectations, the dynamics may lead to different asymptotically
stable fixed points for different parameters of the expectations.
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Expectations, Animal Spirits, and Evolutionary Dynamics.
1 Introduction
In an evolutionary game players typically have no reason to care about the
future rounds of play. There are instances where this assumption is not rea-
sonable. In particular, whenever any sort of commitment occurs (because,
for example, of switching costs, or investment decisions), players are very
well concerned about the future consequences of their current actions. The
previous literature has studied extensively the conditions for stability of be-
havior when players form rational expectations about future paths of play.
(See, for example, Matsui and Matsuyama (1995), Burdzy et al. (2001)).
We consider a scenario in which players’ expectations are more in line with
a bounded rationality assumption. Players play a two–by–two population
game while taking into account some estimation of the present value of fu-
ture payoffs when deciding which action to take. In particular, players follow
an adaptive expectation formation mechanism, whose dynamics depend only
partly on how players tend to extrapolate the current outcomes into the fu-
ture. We provide a global analysis of the induced (deterministic) dynamics
as a function of the parameters governing the dynamics of expectations. In
particular, we observe that the results of standard deterministic evolutionary
dynamics hold only when players’ tendency to extrapolate is not too strong.
In addition, we find that for any initial strategy configuration, the dynamics
can converge to any (if more than one) asymptotically stable fixed point, for
a suitable choice of the initial value of the payoff expectations. (Theorem 1.)
Moreover, starting from the same initial pair of strategy configuration and
values of expectations, the dynamics may lead to different (if more than
one) asymptotically stable fixed points depending on the values of the pa-
rameters that regulate the expectation formation process. (Theorem 2, and
Theorem 3.) It is important to stress the meaning of both our results: when
our dynamics show the same stability properties as the standard evolution-
ary dynamics, then one sort of indeterminacy already emerges in games
where there are multiple asymptotically stable steady states (as in the case
of coordination games). Here the dynamics can converge to any of them,
according to the initial distribution of strategies in the population. The
type of indeterminacy we refer to, instead, is different, in the sense that, the
parameters governing the expectations dynamics determine to which asymp-
totically stable fixed point the dynamics converge for any initial distribution
of strategies and for any initial distributions of expectations.
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The distinction between history dependence and role of expectations in
selecting equilibria has been studied in the macroeconomics literature, with a
focus on rational expectations. (See for example, Matsuyama (1991), Krug-
man (1991) and Diamond and Fudenberg (1989).)
Evolutionary dynamics with perfect foresight have been analyzed by Mat-
sui and Matsuyama (1995). Players can only change their action with some
probability (friction) and take that into account, as well as the nature of the
friction, when choosing an action in a two-by-two coordination game. As
the friction gets smaller a unique equilibrium is selected, the risk dominant
one. In a similar fashion, Burdzy et al. (2001) consider a two-by-two game
with strategic complementarity, whose payoffs change over time. They con-
sider the same sort of friction in players’ ability to change strategies and
find that the risk dominant equilibrium is played at any point in time when
the friction is sufficiently small.
A departure from perfect foresight was taken first by Matsui and Rob
(1992). They consider a game with stochastic overlapping generations of
players whose actions are fixed for the entire life cycle. Players may have
heterogeneous beliefs about the future evolution of play, and their individ-
ual behavior has to be rationalized by one of them. They find, among other
things, that the Pareto efficient equilibrium can be the unique globally ab-
sorbing state. More recently, Matsui and Oyama (2005) consider the same
setup as in Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) but move away from perfect fore-
sight by assuming rationalizable expectations. They find that, when the
level of friction is small enough, and players are playing a generic two–by–
two game, the risk dominant equilibrium is the unique stable set of their
dynamics. Lagunoff (2000) considers an infinitely repeated common inter-
est game in which players play self-fulfilling equilibria. His model is close
to Matsui and Rob (1992) in all the other features. It is shown that the
Pareto dominant equilibrium is a globally absorbing state of the dynamics
when there are relatively small inertia and discounting.
We follow the interpretation of myopic players, and extend it to a setting
in which players observe a public signal about the state variable, and form
(the same) adaptive expectations about its evolution. We provide an ex-
plicit model of these expectations dynamics, that is given by a combination
of extrapolation into the future of current payoffs and an error correction
mechanism, and study the (deterministic) dynamic system that is generated
accordingly. A very similar approach to ours is provided by Conlisk (2001),
who considers an evolutionary (zero–sum) game of competence selection in
which players need to choose how much to invest in ability to overplay their
opponents, and introduces a modification of the replicator dynamics as fol-
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lows: the rate of growth of a strategy distribution, in fact, depends on both
the differential payoff of that strategy compared to the average and the gra-
dient of such a differential. This last term is intended to take into account
a simple extrapolation of the present that allows the dynamics to converge
to some equilibrium rather than cycle around it.
Our formalization is very similar to the one previously used in Antoci
et al. (1992), who analyze the role of animal spirits in the transition process
of an underdeveloped economy into a more advanced one. In such a context,
different dynamics in the expectations lead to different levels of growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the
model is introduced; in section 3 and section 4, some preliminary results are
presented. Section 5 presents our main results, while section 6 contains the
final comments. All the proofs are in the appendix.
2 The expectations augmented evolutionary dy-
namics
Evolutionary dynamics have been extensively studied. Samuelson (1997),
and Weibull (1995) offer, among the others, a comprehensive review of the
literature. For a two–by–two game, the standard specification of a dynamic
evolutionary process is in terms of a vector field
x˙(t) = F (∆pi[x(t)]), (1)
where x˙(t) ≡ dx(t)/dt, and ∆pi[x(t)] is the payoff difference between strate-
gies 1 and 2 at time t. F is generally sign preserving and increasing in its
argument. 1 We know that, for a generic specification of the payoff function
and the initial conditions x (0), there exists an open set Ix(0) such that all
the trajectories starting at Ix(0) converge to the same asymptotically stable
fixed point of (1). If the dynamics represented by (1) possess more than one
asymptotically stable fixed point, then convergence to either one is just a
matter of differences in the initial conditions x(0).
In this paper we modify the dynamics given by equation (1) in order
to take into account the expectations of the players. In particular, we con-
sider a dynamic equation that describes how expectations evolve over time.
Moreover, we allow for a variety of instantaneous payoff functions pi[x(t)],
1Here we are following the terminology introduced by Friedman (1991). When F is sign
preserving, we usually speak of weak compatible dynamics; if moreover it is increasing in
its argument, we speak of order compatible dynamics.
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that can account for positive or negative (network) externalities. Therefore
∆pi[x(t)] will not in general be a monotone function of x(t).
Our model, which we call expectations-augmented evolutionary dynam-
ics, is constructed as follows. Time is continuous and the population of
players is infinite. At any instant t ∈ [0,∞) each player participates in
a two–by–two population game. Players can choose only a pure strategy
i = 1, 2. Let x(t) ∈ [0, 1] denote the proportion of the population of individ-
uals adopting strategy 1 at time t. The instantaneous payoff from adopting
strategy i, at time t, given the state x(t), is represented by pii[x(t)]. Note
that such a function need not necessarily be monotone. If the stage game
payoffs (not the expected payoffs) depend on the fraction of players adopt-
ing each strategy, and if positive and negative externalities are present, then
the function pii[x(t)] may as well have more than one peak.
The present value (evaluated at time t) of the discounted flow of payoffs
of playing strategy i from time t to time t+ T is
V Ti,t ≡
∫ t+T
t
{pii [x(s)]} e−α(s−t)ds, (2)
where the parameter α > 0 represents the discount rate and T can be
taken equal to +∞. Similarly, the present value of the instantaneous payoff
difference at the instant t is
∆V Tt ≡
∫ t+T
t
{∆pi [x(s)]} e−α(s−t)ds. (3)
It is assumed that x(t) is perfectly observable and common knowledge among
the players at any t. Nevertheless players need to form some expectations
about the evolution of x(t) from t to t+ T . It is important to stress that T
need not be finite. Consequently this model can accommodate for scenarios
where players are replaced or can change action only with some (i.i.d.) prob-
ability. In that case α is the effective discounted rate, which incorporates the
death rate. Let y(t) denote the expectation at t about ∆V Tt . Players adopt
the following (non-autonomous) adaptive expectation formation mechanism
y(t) ≡ H
(
t,Ω∆V
T
t
)
, (4)
where H(·) is a continuously differentiable function and Ω∆V Tt is a variable
used as observable proxy of ∆V Tt . It follows that the time derivative of y(t)
is
y˙(t) = Ht +H
Ω∆V
T
t
dΩ∆V
T
t
dt (5)
The following assumptions are made. For any x(t),
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A1 Ω∆V
T
t [x (t)] =
∫ t+T
t {∆pi [x(t)]} e−α(s−t)ds = 1α∆pi [x(t)] (1− e−αT );
A2 H
Ω∆V
T
t
≡ (1 + β), with β > −1;
A3 Ht ≡ γ
[
Ω∆V
T
t [x(t)]− y(t)
]
, with γ > 0.
A1 states that the observable proxy of ∆V Tt is obtained by considering
that the distribution x at time t does not change in the interval [t, t + T ].
The parameter β in A2 measures how conservatively players tend to adjust
their expectations as a consequence of the variability of their proxy. Ceteris
paribus, if β < 0 (β > 0), changes in the proxy will generate a contracted
(amplified) change in the players’ expectations, y˙(t). Finally, A3 represents
an error correction mechanism; if x(t) becomes almost stationary, then ex-
pectations y(t) approach the value of the observable proxy, which in this
case is a good approximation of the true value. Otherwise, expectations are
fed by the variability of the observable proxy through a simple homeostatic
mechanism: if players find out that their guess is too pessimistic on the
basis of the available evidence, they revise their expectations upwards, and
conversely in the opposite case. The parameter γ measures the strength of
this informational feedback.
To sum up, our expectations augmented evolutionary model can be ex-
pressed in terms of the following system of equations
x˙(t) = g [x(t), y(t)] (6)
y˙(t) = γ
[
Ω∆V
T
t [x(t)]− y(t)
]
+ (1 + β)
dΩ∆V
T
t [x(t)]
dt
, (7)
where
dΩ∆V
T
t [x(t)]
dt
=
1
α
(1− e−αT )d∆pi [x(t)]
dx(t)
g [x(t), y(t)] . (8)
Like in Conlisk (2001), the dynamics of the strategy distribution directly
depend on the value of the expectations. In addition, the dynamics of the
expectations are not a mere extrapolation of some proxy from current payoffs
differentials. The following conditions represent a natural analogue of the
order compatible dynamics assumptions for standard evolutionary models
A4 g(x, y) is C1for every x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ R.
A5 g(x, 0) = 0, for every x ∈ [0, 1];
A6 g(x, y) is (strictly) increasing in y, for every x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ R;
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A7 g(0, y) > 0 if y > 0 and g(0, y) = 0 if y < 0; g(1, y) < 0 if y < 0 and
g(1, y) = 0 if y > 0.
A5 states that when the expected payoff difference is zero, i.e. y = 0, none
of the players has an incentive to change action. Therefore any strategy
distribution x is invariant for the population dynamics. A6 amounts to
postulating that the proportion of a given strategy across the population is
increasing (with a growth rate which depends positively on y) if and only if
its payoff is expected to be higher than that of the rival strategy. Finally,
A7 represents a boundary condition that allows the variable x to remain in
the interval [0, 1].
Remark 1 Assumptions A4-A7 pose implicitly some restriction on the par-
tial derivatives of g(x, y). In particular it must be the case that
a) gx(x, 0) = 0, for every x ∈ [0, 1].
b) gy(0, y) = 0, for every y ≤ 0; gy(1, y) = 0, for every y ≥ 0.
c) gx(0, y) < 0, for every y < 0; gx(1, y) < 0, for every y > 0.
Remark 2 Equation (7) may be alternatively written as
d
dt
[
y(t)− Ω∆V Tt [x(t)]
]
= −γ
[
y(t)− Ω∆V Tt [x(t)]
]
+ β
dΩ∆V
T
t [x(t)]
dt
(9)
Thus, if β = 0, expectations dynamics are entirely characterized by the gen-
eral solution
y(t)− Ω∆V Tt [x(t)] = [y(0)− Ω∆V Tt [x(0)]]e−γt (10)
Notice that if y(0) = Ω∆V
T
t [x(0)], then y(t) = Ω∆V
T
t [x(t)] for every future
time.
The aim of the following sections is to study the dynamic properties of
the system (6)-(7), and to derive some preliminary results.
3 Local stability
Definition 1 A fixed point of the system of equations (6)-(7) is a pair (x, y)
such that x˙ = y˙ = 0.
The following result characterizes the set of fixed points of the expecta-
tions augmented dynamics.
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Proposition 1 The set of fixed points of (6)-(7) is given by
1. Any (x, 0) : x ∈ (0, 1) and Ω∆V Tt [x(t)] = 0 (i.e. ∆pi[x(t)] = 0)
2. (0,Ω∆V
T
t [0]), if Ω∆V
T
t [0] ≤ 0 and (1,Ω∆V Tt [1]), if Ω∆V Tt [1] ≥ 0.
Definition 2 We call mixed population fixed point any fixed point of (6)-
(7) of the first type, and pure population fixed point any fixed point of the
second type.
Observe that x = 0 and x = 1 are attractive fixed points of (1) (and
therefore are symmetric Nash equilibria of the underlying game) if and only
if (x, y) = (0,Ω∆V
T
t [0]) and (x, y) = (1,Ω∆V
T
t [1])) are pure population fixed
points of (6)-(7). Moreover, x ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed point of (1), if and only if
(x, 0) is a mixed population fixed point of of (6)-(7).
The following result concerns the local stability of fixed points.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Ω∆V
T
t [x(t)] always intersects the x-axis trans-
versely, then we have that
1. Pure population fixed points are locally attractive.
2. A mixed population fixed point (xˆ, 0) is a saddle point for the dynam-
ics (6)-(7) if dΩ
∆V Tt [x(t)]
dx(t)
∣∣∣∣
(xˆ,0)
> 0 (i.e. d∆pi[x(t)]dx(t)
∣∣∣
(xˆ,0)
> 0); it is an
attractive fixed point if the opposite inequality holds.
Proposition 2 means that the stability properties of any fixed point of (6)-
(7) are the same as those of the corresponding fixed point of (1). Therefore,
the dynamics (6)-(7) preserve the stability properties of the dynamics (1).
Observe that to require a transversal intersection of Ω∆V
T
t [x(t)] with the
x-axis is equivalent to consider games with generic payoffs. Therefore there
is no loss of generality in introducing such a condition, as we will be doing
in the remainder of the paper.
We can now move to the analysis of the global dynamics of the sys-
tem (6)-(7) that is the topic of the next two sections.
4 Global analysis: preliminary results
In order to make a global analysis of the expectations augmented dynamics,
some preliminary results are needed. Consider the following sets
Φ ≡ {(x, y) : x ∈ [0, 1), y ∈ (0,+∞)} , (11)
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and
Λ ≡ {(x, y) : x ∈ (0, 1], y ∈ (−∞, 0)} . (12)
We have that x˙ > 0 for any (x, y) ∈ Φ and x˙ < 0 for any (x, y) ∈ Λ .
Therefore, in both Φ and Λ, x(t) is strictly monotonic, and every trajectory
in these sets can be considered as the graph of a function of x, y = Y (x),
that must satisfy the differential equation
dy
dx
= γ
Ω∆V
T
t [x]− y
g(x, y)
+ (1 + β)
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx
, (13)
where dydx =
y˙
x˙ .
Lemma 1 Equation (13) shows that
1. if β = 0, the curve y = Ω∆V
T
t [x] is an invariant set.
2. if β > 0, then in Φ the trajectories cross the curve y = Ω∆V
T
t [x] from
below when dΩ
∆V Tt [x]
dx > 0, and from above when
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx < 0;
3. if β < 0, then in Φ the trajectories cross the curve y = Ω∆V
T
t [x] from
above when dΩ
∆V Tt [x]
dx > 0, and from below when
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx < 0;
4. A symmetric configuration holds in Λ.
From proposition 2, we know that mixed population fixed points are
saddles (resp. attractive) if the curve y = Ω∆V
T
t [x] at the fixed point crosses
the x-axis from below (resp. above). Thus saddles alternate to attractive
fixed points. When β = 0, the outset (unstable branch) of each saddle
connects the saddle with the nearest attractive fixed points. Figure 1 shows
a possible case. The horizontal line underneath the (x, y) axes represents
the phase portrait in the case of the corresponding dynamics (1), and is
drawn to allow an easy comparison. (Remember proposition 2.)
Insert figure 1 about here
The central part of this section concerns the variations of the outset and
the variations of the inset (stable branch) of each saddle with respect to
changes of the parameters. The analysis highlights some interesting proper-
ties of the shape of the basins of attraction that will be useful in character-
izing our results.
We focus on the case in which there exist at least two mixed population
fixed points, as the results can easily be extended to the remaining cases.
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In particular, it is important to remember that when only pure population
fixed points exist, the predictions by dynamics (1) and (6)-(7) do coincide. 2
Definition 3 Two mixed population fixed points are consecutive if between
them (along the x axis) there are no other fixed points. Let (xn, 0) and
(xn+1, 0) be two consecutive fixed points with 0 < xn < xn+1 < 1.
Without loss of generality, we let Ω∆V
T
t [x] > 0 in the interval (xn, xn+1). 3
Lemma 2 If β ≥ 0, the region of the phase space between the x-axis and
the curve y = (1+β)Ω∆V
T
t [x] is a positively invariant set for the trajectories
of the system (6)-(7)
From the previous lemma, the following result follows.
Lemma 3 if β ≥ 0, then for x > xn the outset of (xn, 0) lies in the region
delimitated by the curve y = (1+ β)Ω∆V
T
t [x] and the x-axis; therefore along
it the fixed point (xn+1, 0) is reached.
Lemma 3 also applies to the case in which (xn, 0) is attracting whereas
(xn+1, 0) is a saddle. In this context, the result concerns the outset of
(xn+1, 0) which, for x ∈ (xn, xn+1), connects these two fixed points. There-
fore, for β ≥ 0, the outset of any saddle point links each fixed point to its
consecutive.
5 Global analysis: main results
We are now in the position to establish our results.
Theorem 1 Suppose that g(x, y) is an infinite of the same order as y, and
that β ≥ 0. Then for any given x(0) ∈ (0, 1), and any given attractive fixed
point (x∗, y∗) of the dynamics (6)-(7), there exists an open set of initial
values of the expectations y(0) such that the trajectory starting at (x(0), y(0))
converges to (x∗, y∗).
2See proposition 2 and the preceding paragraph.
3In this case (xn, 0) is a saddle and (xn+1, 0) is attractive. The context in which
Ω∆V
T
t [x] < 0 in (xn, xn+1) can be analyzed in the same way by considering the distribution
of strategies across the population in terms of the variable (1 − x) instead of x.
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Theorem 1 not only states that whatever the initial distribution of strategies
in the population, the trajectories of the dynamics (6)-(7) converge to any
attractive fixed point by suitably choosing the initial values of the expec-
tations. It also provides us with a parametrization of the attractive fixed
points by open sets, for given x (0). As y (0) varies, the asymptotic behav-
ior of the expectations augmented dynamics jumps from one fixed point to
another. Figures 2 and 3 give a graphical representation of theorem 1.
Insert figure 2 about here
Insert figure 3 about here
Observe that in the example of figure 2, for a given initial value x0 ∈
(0, 1), the dynamics (6)-(7) converge to A, B, or C, if the initial value of
the expectations, y(0), is equal to, respectively, y1, y2, or y3.
Figure 3 shows instead the case of a coordination game, with two strict
Nash equlibria (which are attractive fixed points) and one mixed Nash equi-
librium (which is a saddle point). In the region below the stable branch of
the saddle point (C), the dynamics (6)-(7) converge to the fixed point A.
In the region above the stable branch of the saddle point, they converge to
the fixed point B.
As a result, while for the dynamics (1), initial strategy distributions
that are sufficiently close converge to the same attractive fixed point, in
the expectations augmented dynamics, they can converge to different fixed
points. This result is due to the fact that the expectations play a role in
the determination of the basins of attraction of the fixed points. Therefore
a clear prediction on the evolution of the system can be done only after
we know both the initial strategy distribution and the initial value of the
expectations. We suggest that this feature of the expectations-augmented
dynamics can be interpreted as a representation of the action of the Keyne-
sian animal spirits.
A description of the proof of theorem 1 may help to better appreciate its
significance and its limitations. The condition on g(x, y) (which basically
means that x needs to be sufficiently reactive to expectations y) implies
that all the trajectories, included those that generate the stable branches of
each saddle, do not have vertical asymptotes at any x¯ ∈ (0, 1). 4 Moreover,
β ≥ 0 implies, by lemma 3, that the stable branches of each saddle lie,
4Possible specifications of x˙ satisfying this condition are g(x, y) = x(1− x)y as well as
g(x, y) = p(1 − x)y if y > 0 and g(x, y) = −pxy if y < 0, where p can be interpreted as
the replacement rate of players as in Matsui and Matsuyama (1995).
11
respectively, one entirely in the region of the plane where y > 0, and the
other in y < 0. Therefore, for any x(0), the vertical line passing through that
point has a non-empty intersection with all the basins of attractions of all
the fixed points. Unfortunately nothing can be said, analytically, about the
robustness of this result to some restrictions about the initial values of the
expectations, one natural candidate being y(0) ∈ [αmin∆pi(x)
(1−e−αT ) ,
αmax∆pi(x)
(1−e−αT ) ].
Such a restriction about initial beliefs may not be too stringent in the case
where players do not know the payoffs of the game. 5
Notice also that, for β ≥ 0, along the system’s trajectories the sign of x˙
can change at most once; thus we cannot observe persistent oscillations of
the distribution of strategies. On the other hand, this may not be the case
if β < 0.
The last thing to check is how the basins of attraction change with
respect to the parameters. Consider two successive fixed points (xn, 0) and
(xn+1, 0), xn+1 > xn, where the former is a saddle and the latter is attractive.
Theorem 2 Assume that x(0) ∈ (xn, xn+1), y(0) ≥ 0, and Ω∆ETt [x(0)] > 0.
Then there exists an interval [β∗,+∞) such that, if β ∈ [β∗,+∞), the tra-
jectory starting at [x(0), y(0)] approaches (xn+1, 0). The same (symmetric)
result holds for y(0) ≤ 0 when (xn+1, 0) is a saddle and (xn, 0) is attractive.
The above result says that, when we have two consecutive fixed points
(xn+1, 0) and (xn, 0), if xn < x(0) < xn+1 and
y(0) ≥ 0, Ω∆ETt [x(0)] > 0, or y(0) ≤ 0, Ω∆ETt [x(0)] < 0, (14)
the trajectory starting from (x(0), y(0)) converges to the attracting fixed
point (xn+1, 0) if β is big enough. 6 Figure 4 shows a graphical representation
of the theorem.
Insert figure 4 about here
It is important to stress that this result holds even if there are many stable
fixed points.
Condition (14) requires that both y(0) and the proxy have the same sign.
If this holds, theorem 2 states that for any initial level of the expectations, a
sufficiently high level of β allows the system to converge to (xn+1, 0). Both
dynamics (1) and (6)-(7) converge to the same strategy distribution. Note
5It is also important to stress that all the other results in the paper do not depend
neither on y(0) nor on the restriction on g(x, y).
6Remember that the parameter β represents the reactivity of expectations to changes
of the observable proxy Ω∆V
T
t [x(t)].
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also that a large β is not sufficient to generate such a qualitative equivalence
between the two dynamics. We also need that the signs of the initial value
of the expectations and of the proxy be the same. The next theorem takes
into account the case in which β is large but the proxy and the initial value
of the expectations have different signs. As we will see, the dynamics (1)
and (6)-(7) converge to different strategy distributions.
Assume first that there exist only three mixed population fixed points:
(x1, 0), (x2, 0) and (x3, 0), 0 < x1 < x2 < x3 < 1, where the middle one is a
saddle and the other two are attracting. Thus Ω∆V
T
t [x] > 0 for x ∈ (x2, x3)
and Ω∆E
T
t [x] < 0 for x ∈ (x1, x2). Theorem 2 concerns the case in which the
initial value of expectations y(0) has the same sign of the value of the signal
Ω∆E
T
t [x(0)]. [See (14).] When this is not the case, we have the following
result.
Theorem 3 Assume that x(0) ∈ (x1, x2) and Ω∆V Tt [x(0)] < 0 < y(0). If
Ω∆V
T
t [x] is increasing in [x(0), x2] and if in {(x, y) : x ∈ [x(0), x2], y > 0}
the following inequality is satisfied[
Ω∆V
T
t [x]− y
g(x, y)
]
y
> 0, i.e. gy(x, y) >
g(x, y)
y − Ω∆V Tt [x] (15)
then there exists an interval [β∗∗,+∞) such that the trajectory starting from
[x(0), y(0)] converges to (x3, 0) if β ∈ [β∗∗,+∞).
Proposition 3 The symmetric case holds if x(0) ∈ (x2, x3) and y(0) < 0 <
Ω∆V
T
t [x(0)].
Condition (15) simply requires that the reactivity of x˙ with respect to
the expectations be high enough. Theorem 3 says that when the initial
value of the expectations has a different sign from that of the observable
proxy (animal spirits) and β is big enough, a trajectory starting with a
strategy distribution between two successive fixed points, converges to the
third fixed point of the system. Figure 5 provides a graphical interpretation
of the theorem.
Insert figure 5 about here
In figure 5, the trajectory starting from (x(0), y(0)), with y(0) > 0 and
x(0) ∈ (x∗, B), converges to point C when β is sufficiently large. On the
other hand, under the dynamics (1), the trajectory starting at x = x(0)
converges to a point whose coordinate on the x axis is the same as A.
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Figure 6 represents theorem 3 in the case of a coordination game, where
x = 0 and x = 1 are the only two attractive fixed points. In this case, since
the proxy is always increasing in x, theorem 3 holds for any x(0) ∈ [0, 1].
Insert figure 6 about here
For any x(0) < B, we have that strategy 1’s current payoff is smaller than
strategy 2’s. Nevertheless, the former grows faster as x increases. As x gets
bigger than B, strategy 1’s current payoff becomes bigger than strategy
2’s. Therefore, if β is big enough, the dynamics of the expectations give
greater importance to the fact that strategy 1 has a steeper gradient than
that of strategy 2, irrespective of their current payoffs. As a result, the
dynamics (6)-(7) converge to point C, where everybody adopts strategy 1.
On the other hand, dynamics (1) converge to x = 0 if x(0) < xs and to
x = 1 if x(0) > xs.
Clearly, theorem 3 also applies if the system admits more than three
mixed population fixed points. In this case the trajectory converges to one
of the non-successive fixed points.
To sum up, the dynamics (1) and (6)-(7) generate the same prediction
about the asymptotic strategy distribution only when the proxy and the
initial value of the expectations have the same sign, with β sufficiently big
(theorem 2). In fact, when β is large but the proxy and the initial value
of the expectations have opposite sign, the two dynamics generate different
predictions (theorem 3).
These results, together with the basic indeterminacy from theorem 1,
imply that for large β the expectations matter more than the initial strategy
distribution.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have characterized the stability properties of an expec-
tations augmented evolutionary dynamics and compared them to standard
evolutionary dynamics. We found that new, more radical kinds of indeter-
minacies arise in addition to the already well know ones. First, for fixed
parameters, β and γ, of the expectation mechanism and for any initial con-
dition on the strategy profile, x(0), it is possible to converge to any of the
attractive fixed points of the expectations augmented dynamics in corre-
spondence of different initial values of the expectations, y(0). Second, for
any initial values x(0) and y(0) it is possible to converge to different attrac-
tive fixed points of the expectations augmented dynamics in correspondence
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of different parameter values of the expectation mechanism. A necessary
condition for our indeterminacy results is that β, the measure of the re-
activity of the expectations to changes of the observable proxy, be large
enough. Notice that nothing has been said about the parameter γ. The rea-
son is simple: a large γ implies that the expectation augmented evolutionary
dynamics generate the same qualitative result as the standard evolutionary
dynamics. We can interpret this setup as a formalization of the Keynesian
animal spirits.
A Proofs of the results
In this section we provide the proofs of our results.
Proof of Lemma 1. The first point has already been shown in
remark 2. Observe that at y = Ω∆V
T
t [x] equation (13) shows that dydx has
the same sign as dΩ
∆V Tt [x]
dx , for any β > −1. This implies that, for y > 0,
when β > 0 (β < 0), the trajectories are steeper (flatter) than y = Ω∆V
T
t [x].
This shows points 2 and 3. The last point can be proved in a similar way.
Proof of Lemma 2. The slope of the trajectories evaluated along the
curve y = (1 + β)Ω∆E
T
t [x] can be written as
dy
dx
∣∣∣∣
y=(1+β)Ω∆V
T
t [x]
= γ
Ω∆V
T
t [x]− (1 + β)Ω∆V Tt [x]
g(x, y)
+ (1 + β)
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx
= −βγΩ
∆V Tt [x]
g(x, y)
+ (1 + β)
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx
, (16)
whereas the slope of y = (1 + β)Ω∆V
T
t [x] is (1 + β)dΩ
∆V Tt [x]
dx . Since along
y = (1 + β)Ω∆V
T
t [x] we have that sign
{
(1 + β)Ω∆V
T
t [x]
}
= sign{g(x, y)},
the lemma is proved.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Y¯ u(x) denote the outset of x. The case
with β = 0 follows simply by noticing that for xn < x < xn+1 it holds
Y¯ u(xn) ≡ Ω∆V Tt [x]. Consider now the case with β > 0 and suppose that
for x close to xn, Y¯ u(x) lies above the curve y = (1 + β)Ω∆V
T
t [x]. We
shall show that this generates a contradiction. Every trajectory Y (x) of the
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system (6)-(7) satisfies the following integral equation
Y (x∗) = Y (x∗) + γ
∫ x∗
x∗
Ω∆V
T
t [x]− Y (x)
g (x, Y (x))
dx (17)
+(1 + β)
[
Ω∆V
T
t [x∗]− Ω∆V Tt [x∗]
]
,
where x∗ > x∗.
For x∗ → xn and x∗ > xn, if Y¯ u(x) > (1 + β)Ω∆V Tt [x] in (xn, x∗], then
it must be the case that
Y¯ u(x∗)− (1 + β)Ω∆V Tt [x] =
Y¯ u(xn) + γ
∫ x∗
xn
Ω∆V
T
t [x]− Y¯ u(x)
g
(
x, Y¯ u(x)
) dx
+ (1 + β)
[
Ω∆V
T
t [x∗]− Ω∆V Tt [xn]
]
− (1 + β)Ω∆V Tt [x]
= γ
∫ x∗
xn
Ω∆V
T
t [x]− Y¯ u(x)
g
(
x, Y¯ u(x)
) dx > 0. (18)
This generates the desired contradiction since, by assumption, Ω
∆V Tt [x]−Y¯ u(x)
g(x,Y¯ u(x)) <
0 when Y¯ u(x∗) > (1 + β)Ω∆V Tt [x] > Ω∆V Tt [x].
Proof of Theorem 2. For 0 ≤ y(0) ≤ Ω∆V Tt [x(0)], the inter-
val is [0,+∞); in fact, the curve y = Ω∆V Tt [x] is invariant for β = 0.
If y(0) > Ω∆V
T
t [x(0)], we choose β∗ to be the solution of the equation
y(0) = (1 + β∗)Ω∆V Tt [x(0)]. The proof for the case in which y(0) ≥ 0,
(xn+1, 0) is attractive, and (xn, 0) is a saddle is completed by just applying
theorem 1. The proof of the symmetric case follows the same steps of the
previous one.
Proof of Theorem 3. First observe that the partial derivative of dydx
with respect to β in (13) is given by(
dy
dx
)
β
=
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx
. (19)
This means that the slope (dydx) of trajectories in Φ ∪ Λ increases with β if
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx > 0 and decreases with β if
dΩ∆V
T
t [x]
dx < 0.
Consider now the case: x(0) ∈ (x1, x2) and Ω∆V Tt [x(0)] < 0 < y(0).
Take an x∗ ∈ (x(0), x2); the trajectory Y (x) passing through [x(0), y(0)]
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must satisfy the integral equation
Y (x∗) = Y (0) + γ
∫ x∗
x(0)
Ω∆V
T
t [x]− Y (x)
g(x, Y (x))
dx (20)
+(1 + β)
[
Ω∆V
T
t [x∗]− Ω∆V Tt [x(0)]
]
Notice that
1. by (19), if we take two values of β, β1 < β2, then in the interval
[x(0), x2] the trajectory passing through [x(0), y(0)] when β = β2 lies
above the one passing through [x(0), y(0)] when β = β1.
2. By (19), in the interval [x(0), x2] the inset Y¯ s(x) of (x2, 0) for β = β2
lies below the inset Y¯ s(x) of (x2, 0) for β = β1.
3. Since, by assumption, Ω∆V
T
t [x] is increasing in [x(0), x2], it follows
that
[
Ω∆V
T
t [x∗]− Ω∆V Tt [x(0)]
]
> 0.
4. By (15), the (negative) value of
∫ x∗
x(0)
Ω∆V
T
t [x]−Y (x)
g(x,Y (x)) dx increases if β
increases.
Therefore, from (20) we have that, as β increases, Y (x∗) becomes arbi-
trarily big and there must exist a β∗∗ such that, for every β ∈ [β∗∗,+∞),
Y (x) > Y¯ s(x) for every x ∈ [x(0), x2]. This implies that the trajectory
starting from [x(0), y(0)] converges to (x3, 0). By the same token we can
prove the symmetric case of the theorem.
17
References
Antoci, A., A. Gay, and V. Guidi (1992). Sviluppo, sottosviluppo e crescita
accelerata. Studi e Discussioni, n. 81. Department of Economics, Univer-
sity of Florence.
Burdzy, K., D. M. Frankel, and A. Pauzner (2001). Fast equilibrium selection
by rational players living in a changing world. Econometrica 69 (1), 163–
189.
Conlisk, J. (2001). Costly predation and the distribution of competence.
American Economic Review 91 (3), 475–484.
Diamond, P. and D. Fudenberg (1989). Rational expectations business cycles
in search equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 97 (3), 606–619.
Friedman, D. (1991). Evolutionary games in economics. Econometrica 59,
637–666.
Krugman, P. (1991). History versus expectations. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 106 (2), 651–667.
Lagunoff, R. (2000). On the evolution of pareto - optimal behavior in re-
peated coordination problems. International Economic Review 41 (2), 273
– 293.
Matsui, A. and K. Matsuyama (1995). An approach to equilibrium selection.
Journal of Economic Theory 65, 415–434.
Matsui, A. and D. Oyama (2005). Rationalizable foresight dynamics. Mimeo,
University of Tokio.
Matsui, A. and R. Rob (1992, October). Evolution, rationality and equilib-
rium selection in societal games. Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
Matsuyama, K. (1991). Incresing returns, industrialization, and indetermi-
nacy of equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (2), 617–650.
Samuelson, L. (1997). Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
18
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
..
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
..
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
0 1
x
y
0 1
x
................................................... ....
....
....
....
....
.....
.......
..........
........
...................................................................
........
.....
....
....
....
....
....
..
y = Ω∆V
T
t [x]
 
 
.........
...
....
.........
..........
...
.............
............
............
............
............  ⊙•
•
......................................................................................................................................................................................................
....
.......
........
...
.........
...
.........
...
....
........
Figure 1: A possible phase portrait for the expectations augmented dynam-
ics. Attractive fixed points are represented by filled circles, repulsive fixed
points by dotted circles, and saddle points by dots.
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Figure 2: A graphical representation of theorem 1. Attractive fixed points
are represented by filled circles, repulsive fixed points by dotted circles, and
saddle points by dots.
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Figure 3: A possible phase portrait for a coordination game. Attractive
fixed points are represented by filled circles, repulsive fixed points by dotted
circles, and saddle points by dots.
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Figure 4: A graphical representation of theorem 2. Attractive fixed points
are represented by filled circles, repulsive fixed points by dotted circles, and
saddle points by dots.
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Figure 5: A graphical representation of theorem 3. Attractive fixed points
are represented by filled circles, repulsive fixed points by dotted circles, and
saddle points by dots.
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Figure 6: A graphical representation of theorem 3 in the case of a coordina-
tion game. Attractive fixed points are represented by filled circles, repulsive
fixed points by dotted circles, and saddle points by dots.
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